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The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: United States v. Leon' and Mas-
sachusetts v. Sheppard 2 The fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures and requires that warrants which authorize searches be based on probable cause."
The amendment also requires that warrants particularly describe the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized. The exclusionary rule"' is a judicially created
doctrine used to effectuate the commands of the fourth amendment. The rule dictates
that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment may not be used by the
government in prosecuting those persons whose rights have been violated.' Since 1914,
when it was first adopted by the Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States, the exclusionary
rule has been embroiled in controversy." Proponents claim that the exclusionary rule is
the only effective method by which courts can safeguard the rights guaranteed by the
fourth amendment.' Detractors believe that the rule is not justified in light of the burden
which it imposes on effective law enforcement.'
Much of the debate has centered on the purposes of the fourth amendment exclil
sionary rule. 9 Two competing schools of thought have developed. One view contends
that the application of the exclusionary rule should be limited to situations where it
104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
2 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984).
5 The fourth amendment provides:
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause supported by Oath or affirmation and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655; Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
6 See generally Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-90 (1976); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1970) (Burger, J., dissenting);
Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) The Exclusionary Rule Rest on a"Principled Basis" Rather than an"Empirical
Proposition?," 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565 (1983); LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World:
On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 U. Pirr. L. REV. 307 (1982); Mertens & Wasserstrom,
The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO.
L.J. 365 (1981); Schrock & ‘Velsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional
Requirement, 59 MINN. L. Rev. 251 (1974); Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The
Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1365 (1983); Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257
(1984).
See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 6, at 1380-85.
8 See, e.g., Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411 (Burger, J., dissenting). Justice Burger stated:
For more than 55 years this Court has enforced a rule under which evidence of
undoubted reliability and probative value has been suppressed and excluded from
criminal cases whenever it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment
Notwithstanding its plausibility, many judges and lawyers and some of our most
distinguished legal scholars have never quite been able to escape the force of Cardozo's
statement of the doctrine's anomalous result: "The criminal is to go free because the
constable has blundered .... A room is searched against the law, and the body of a
murdered man is found .... The privacy of the home has been infringed, and the
murderer goes free." People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 23-24, 150 N.E. 585, 587,
588 (1926).
Id. at 412-13.
9 In large part, this can be attributed to the fact that the underlying rationale of the rule was
not explicitly articulated in the cases in which the rule was born. See Stewart, supra note 6, at 1372.
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serves to deter police from conducting illegal searches." Commentators who subscribe
to this view contend that where the costs to effective law enforcement outweigh any
deterrent value in using the rule, the admission of illegally seized evidence does not
constitute an independent fourth amendment violation." The opposing school of
thought takes a broader view, asserting that the purpose of the rule is to restrain the
government as a whole in its attempts to discover and punish lawbreakers.' 2 Under this
view, the effect of the exclusion of evidence on future police lawlessness is relevant but
not dispositive in determining whether the rule should be applied in a particular in-
stance."
In United States v. Leon," the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether evidence
obtained in a police search should be barred from use in the prosecution's case-in-chief
where an officer reasonably relies on a warrant which is later found to be invalid. In
Massachusetts v. Sheppard,L 5 the Court addressed the issue of whether evidence obtained
during a search pursuant to a warrant that failed to provide an accurate description of
the items to be seized should be admitted. These decisions are the latest in a long line
of cases in which members of the Court debated the proper scope of the fourth amend-
ment exclusionary rule."
In Leon, a confidential informant of unproven reliability informed an officer of the
Burbank, California Police Department that two persons known to him as "Armando"
' 0 See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,343 (1974).
" See id. at 354. According to this "fragmentary" view, the court acts as a neutral conduit of
evidence. In effect, whatever "taint" might have accrued from the illegal seizure is "laundered" as
it passes through the hands of the judiciary. See Schrock & Welsh, supra note 6, at 251.
' 2 See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 356-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This is called the "unitary" model
of prosecution. According to the unitary model, by excluding evidence "the court stops the entire
government, of which it is a part, from consummating a wrongful course of conduct — a course
of conduct begun but by no means ended when the police invade the defendant's privacy." Schrock
& Welsh, supra note 6. at 257-60. See also Kamisar, supra note 6, at 589 n.160,639. The Weeks Court
adhered to this view. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391-93.
13 See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 356-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
n 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
" 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984).
16 See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (defendant's statements made in
response to proper cross-examination are subject to impeachment by government by illegally seized
evidence which is inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt); Michigan v. DeFillippo. 443 U.S.
31 (1979) (need not exclude fruits of a search incident to an arrest made in good faith reliance on
a substantive criminal statute subsequently declared unconstitutional); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128 (1978) (standing to invoke the exclusionary rule limited to cases in which the prosecution seeks
to use the fruits of an illegal search or seizure against the victim of police misconduct); United
States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. '268 (1978) (witness's testimony may be admitted even though his or
her identity was discovered in an unconstitutional search); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)
(where a state has provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate a fourth-amendment claim, a state
prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence was obtained
through an unconstitutional search and seizure); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (illegally
seized evidence may be admitted in federal civil trials); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974) (declined to allow grand jury witnesses to refuse to answer questions based on illegally seized
evidence); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (persons aggrieved solely by the intro-
duction of damaging evidence unlawfully obtained from their co-conspirators or co-defendants
cannot seek suppression of the evidence); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (the exclusionary
rule announced in Mapp does not apply to state court convictions which had become final before
its rendition).
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and "Patsy" were selling large quantities of cocaine and methaqualone from their resi-
dence at 620 Price Drive in Burbank." The informant also indicated that he had
witnessed a sale of methaqualone by Patsy at the residence approximately five months
before and had observed at that time a shoebox containing a large amount of cash that
belonged to Patsy." The informant stated that Armando and Patsy kept only small
quantities of drugs at their residence and stored the remainder at another location in
Burbank."
On the basis of this information, the Burbank police initiated an extensive investi-
gation which focused first on the Price Drive residence and later on residences at Via
Magdalena and Sunset Canyon 2° Cars parked at the Price Drive residence were deter-
mined to belong to respondents Armando Sanchez and Patsy Stewart. 2 ' During the
investigation, officers had observed an automobile belonging to respondent Richard Del
Castillo arriving at the Price Drive residence. 22 The driver entered the house and left
with a small paper sack." A check of Del Castillo's probation records led police to
respondent Alberto Leon, who was listed as Del Castillo's employer.24
Subsequently, the officers observed several persons, at least one of whom had prior
drug involvement, arriving at the Price Drive residence and leaving with small packages."
The officers also observed Sanchez and Stewart board separate flights for Miami. 26 Both
Sanchez and Stewart later returned to Los Angeles by plane." At the airport Sanchez
and Stewart consented to a search of their luggage. 28 The search uncovered a small
amount of marijuana." Based on these and other observations summarized in an affi-
davit, an experienced and well trained narcotics investigator of the Burbank Police
Department prepared an application for a warrant to search the three residences and
automobiles registered to each of the respondents for evidence of drug trafficking
activity."
Several deputy district attorneys reviewed the extensive application prepared by the
police officer." A state superior court judge then issued a facially valid search warrant."
17 Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3409.
12 Id. at 3409-10.
ig Id. at 3410.
20 Id.
21 Id. Sanchez had previously been arrested for possession of marijuana. Stewart had no criminal
record. Id.
22 Id. Del Castillo had previously been arrested for possession of fifty pounds of marijuana. Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. Leon had been arrested in 1980 on drug charges and Leon's companion informed police
at that time that Leon was heavily involved in the importation of drugs to this country. Before the
current investigation, an informant had informed police that Leon stored a large quantity of
methaqualone at his residence. During this investigation, the Burbank police learned that Leon was
living at 716 South Sunset Canyon in Burbank. Id.
25 Id. at 3410. The Court mentioned that a variety of other activity was observed at the Price
Drive and Sunset Canyon residences as well as at .a condominium at Via Magdalena. Activity
involving respondents' automobiles also was noted. Id,
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
1° Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
612	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 27:609
The ensuing searches netted large quantities of drugs at. the Via Magdalena and Sunset
Canyon residences and a small quantity at the Price Drive residence." Respondents were
indicted in the United States District Court for the Central District of California and
charged with conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine and a variety of other sub-
stantive counts 34
The respondents filed pretrial motions to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to
the warrant." The district court held an evidentiary hearing and granted the motions
to suppress in part,36 concluding that the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable
cause." The court made clear the fact that the officers who conducted the search had
acted in good faith. 38 The court, however, refused the government's invitation to rule
that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule should not apply where evidence is seized
in reasonable, good faith reliance on an invalid warrant, and instead relied upon the
existing law of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit." Thus, the
district court only ruled on the probable cause question and suppressed the evidence on
the grounds that probable cause was lacking. 1 "
The district court denied the government's motion for reconsideration and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed:" The court of appeals concluded that the information provided
by the informant failed to satisfy the two-prong test for probable cause established by
the Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas" and Spinelli v. United States." As it was further
found that these deficiencies had not been cured by independent police investigation,
the court ruled that the affidavit did not establish probable cause."
33 1d, Other evidence was discovered at each of the residences and in Stewart's and Del Castillo's
automobiles. Id,
si Id.
35 /4.
" Id. at 3410-11. The Court did not suppress all of the evidence as to all of the respondents
because none of the respondents had standing to challenge all of the searches. Id.
" Id. at 3411.
" Id.
39 1d, at 3411 n.4.
40 Id. at 3411.
4 ' Id.
42 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
43 393 U.S. 410 (1969). Under this test the affidavit must: (1) set forth the basis of the infor-
mant's knowledge of criminal activity and (2) must establish the informant's credibility. See id. at
415-16. In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the Court abandoned the two-pronged Aguilar-
Spinelli test for determining whether an informant's tip suffices to establish probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant, and substituted a "totality of circumstances" approach. In Gates, the Court
stated:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical. common-sense decision
whether, givers all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including
the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information
there is a fait - probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the
magistrate had a "substantial basis for .. , concluding" that probable cause existed.
Id. at 238-39.
The Court's adoption of this less restrictive Gales test occurred after the Ninth Circuit decided
Leon.
4 ' Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3411.
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The government's petition for certiorari expressly declined to seek review of the
lower court's determination that the warrant was unsupported by probable cause. 15 The
only question presented was "[w]hether the fourth amendment exclusionary rule should
be modified so as not to bar the admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith
reliance on a search warrant subsequently held to be defective."" The Supreme Court
granted certiorari• 17
In Leon, a six-to-three majority" of the Supreme Court held that the fourth amend-
ment exclusionary rule should not be applied so as to bar use in the prosecution's case-
in-chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant
issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but found ultimately to be invalid." The
Court noted that little or no deterrent effect could be achieved against officers who had
acted in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a warrant." The Court, therefore, concluded
that the minimal deterrent value that the exclusion of evidence would have in these
circumstances is outweighed by the social cost such exclusion would exact."
Massachusetts v. Sheppard," a case decided on the same day as Leon, involved a murder
investigation in which the badly burned body of a woman was discovered in a vacant lot
in the Roxbury section of Boston." After a brief investigation, the police decided to
question one of the victim's boyfriends, Osborne Sheppard." Sheppard said that he had
been playing cards at a local gaming house from 9 p.m. Friday to 5 a.m. Saturday, the
night of the murder." The police learned, however, that although Sheppard was there
that night, he had borrowed an automobile at about 3 a.m. Saturday morning to give
two men a ride home. 56
On Sunday morning, the owner of the car that Sheppard had borrowed consented
to a police inspection of the vehicle. 57 Bloodstains and strands of hair were found on
the bumper and in the trunk of the car. 56 Also in the trunk were strands of wire similar
to wire found on the victim. 59 On the basis of this evidence, detective Peter O'Malley
drafted an affidavit designed to support an application for an arrest warrant and a
search warrant authorizing a search of Sheppard's residence.'"
43 Id. at 3412.
' 6 1d.
47 Id.
"Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor con-
stituted the majority, while justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens dissented.
49 Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3416. Although the Court recognized that it could consider the question
whether probable cause existed under the new Gates standard, it assumed that probable cause was
absent, as the lower court found. Id. at 3412.
5° Id. at 3420.
" Id. at 3421.
52 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984).
" Id. at 3426.
54 Id.
" Id.
56 Even though the trip normally only took 15 minutes, Sheppard did not return for nearly
two hours. Id.
57 Id.
is Id.
59 Id.
'° Id. at 3426-27. The affidavit set forth the results of the investigation and stated that the
police wished to search for:
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Detective O'Malley showed the affidavit to the district attorney and the district
attorney's first assistant, who concluded that it set forth probable cause for the arrest
and search. 61 Because it was Sunday and the local court was closed, the police had a
difficult time finding a warrant application. 62 Detective O'Malley found a warrant form
used for controlled substances. 63 Knowing that changes had to be made on the form, he
struck the subtitle "controlled substance." 64 '['he reference to "controlled substances,"
however, was not deleted in the part of the form that constituted the warrant application
and that when signed, would constitute the warrant itself. 65
Officer O'Malley took the affidavit and warrant form to a judge who stated he would
authorize the search,° 6 The judge assured O'Malley he would make the necessary changes
and indeed made some changes before dating and signing the warrant. 67
 He did not,
however, change the substantive part of the warrant, which continued to authorize a
search for controlled substances, nor did he alter the form so as to incorporate the
affidavit. 68 O'Malley took the warrant and affidavit, and accompanied by other officers,
proceeded to Sheppard's residence. 6° The scope of the ensuing search was limited to the
items listed in the affidavit and several incriminating pieces of evidence were discov-
ered. 70 Sheppard was then charged with first degree murder."
At a pretrial suppression hearing, the trial judge concluded that the warrant failed
to conform to the commands of the fourth amendment because it did not particularly
describe the items to be seized. 72 The judge ruled, however, that the evidence could be
admitted notwithstanding the defect in the warrant because the police had acted in good-
faith in executing what they reasonably thought was a valid warrant's
[A] fifth bottle of amaretto liquor, two nickel bags of marijuana, a woman's jacket that
has been described as black-grey (charcoal), any possessions of Sandra D. Boulware,
similar type wire and rope that match those on the body of Sandra D. Boulware, or
in the above Thunderbird. A blunt instrument that might have been used on the
victim, men's or women's clothing that may have blood, gasoline burns on them. Items
that may have fingerprints of the victim.
Id.
The liquor and marijuana were included in the request because Sheppard had told police that
when he was last with the victim, the two had purchased these things before going to his residence.
Id. at 3426-27,3427 n, I.
81 Id. at 3427.
62 Id.
65 Id. The form was entitled Search Warrant-Controlled Substance, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276
§§ I through 3A (West 1972). Id.
64 Id.
68 Id.
66 Id.
67 id.
66 Id. These oversights became significant because they made the warrant vulnerable to attack
for being facially deficient due to failure to describe particularly the things to be seized. Such
particularity is, of course, a requirement of the fourth amendment.
83 Id. at 3427-28.
"Id. The police found a pair of bloodstained boots, bloodstains on the concrete floor, a woman's
earring with blood on it, a bloodstained envelope, a pair of men's jockey shorts and women's
leotards with blood on them, three types of wire, and a woman's hairpiece, subsequently identified
as the victim's. Id. at 3428 n.4.
7 ' Id. at 3428.
72 Id.
22 Id.
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On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decided that the evidence
should be suppressed. 74 A plurality concluded that although the police acted in reason-
able, good-faith reliance on the warrant, the evidence had to be excluded because the
United States Supreme Court had not recognized a good-faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule.7 ' The Supreme Court granted certiorari and set the case for argument in
conjunction with United States v. Leon. 76
In applying the Leon "good-faith exception" rule in Sheppard, the Court held that
the evidence against the defendant should be admitted despite the fact that the warrant
failed to describe particularly the items to be seized." The Court stated that the rule
was designed to deter unlawful searches by police, not to punish a magistrate's error. 78
The majority thus concluded that the suppression of evidence merely because a judge
failed to make all of the necessary clerical changes on a warrant would not further the
deterrence function of the exclusionary rule. 79
The Leon and Sheppard cases are important developments in fourth amendment
jurisprudence which will no doubt have a pervasive effect on law enforcement practices.
The Leon decision provides for the admission of evidence obtained through police
searches even though probable cause is lacking, so long as there is reasonable reliance
on a warrant. Sheppard raises the possibility of the admission of evidence even though
the warrant is facially deficient as long as there is reasonable reliance on that warrant.
Together they mark the first time since Weeks that the Court has allowed the fruits of
admittedly unconstitutional searches to be used in the prosecution's case-in-chief.
This casenote will begin by briefly reviewing the historical background of the exclu-
sionary rule. Next, the casenote will discuss the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the
Leon and Sheppard cases. The Court's reasoning in these two cases will then be analyzed
against the historical background. First, this casenote will examine the Court's assumption
in Leon and Sheppard that the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police
from conducting illegal searches. This analysis will contend that such an assumption is
contrary to the purposes which the founding fathers hoped to achieve in adopting the
fourth amendment, as well as to the reasoning of the judicial decisions in which the rule
was formulated. Second, the majority's use of cost-benefit analysis will be examined. It
will be contended that the majority's cost-benefit analysis was flawed both because the
data the Court employed were inaccurate and because such data were misapplied. Finally,
the deleterious effect which the Leon and Sheppard cases may have on future fourth
amendment jurisprudence will be discussed.
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The history of the exclusionary rule can be divided into two fairly distinct eras
during which two different purposes were offered to justify the remedy. The first era
extends from the cases in which the rule was first formulated through the time of the
Warren Court. During this period the unitary view of prosecution was consistently,
though not always explicitly, advocated. The exclusionary rule was seen as a restraint on
74 Id.
15 Id.
76 Id.
" Id. at 3429-30.
78 /d. at 3429.
79 Id.
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the judiciary as well as the executive. This era witnessed the continual expansion of the
scope of the exclusionary rule, so as to prevent the admission of illegally seized evidence
in any tribunal, state or federal.
The second era, which coincides with Chief Justice Burger's tenure, has been char-
acterized by the emergence of the fragmentary model of prosecution. During this period,
police deterrence has come to be perceived as the raison d'etre of the exclusionary rule.
According to this view, the judiciary plays a peripheral role in the criminal justice process,
being merely a neutral conduit for evidence." During this second era the scope of the
exclusionary rule has been steadily restricted.
A. The Traditional View: The Judiciary and Executive as Component Parts of the Evidence
Gathering Process
Nearly a century after the adoption of the fourth amendment, the problem of how
best to enforce its mandates began to be addressed by the Supreme Court. Although
the text of the fourth amendment does not provide remedies for its violations, the need
to safeguard the amendment's guarantees led to the creation of the exclusionary rule.
The cases in which the doctrine was first articulated focused on maintaining the purity
of the process of "bringing proof to the aid of government." 81
 In these cases, the fourth
amendment's prohibitions were seen as operating against the government as a whole, so
as to prevent it from benefiting from Constitutional violations. 82
The rudiments of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule are found in the 1886
case of Boyd v. United States. 83 Boyd did not involve a traditional search and seizure but
rather concerned subpoenas issued pursuant to an act of Congress 84
 which gave the
claimants the option of producing evidence or allowing allegations against them to be
taken as true. 85
 By excluding the evidence produced under these circumstances Boyd
became the first judicial decision which implicitly envisioned a monolithic prosecution
m See Schrock & Welsh, supra note 6, at 255-56.
Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393.
82 Id.
" 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Boyd involved an attempt by New York businessmen to import plate
glass in violation of import and revenue laws. The government sought invoices to prove the value
of the glass. Pursuant to section of the "Act of June 22, 1874," a judge issued subpoenas which
were served on the claimants. The subpoenas stated that if the papers were not produced the
allegations would be taken as confessed. The claimants produced the evidence but appealed on the
grounds that the compelled production of the papers violated the fourth and fifth amendments.
Id. at 618-20.
84 "Act to amend the customs revenue laws, and to moieties," ch. 391, 18 Stat. 186 (1874).
Section 5 reads:
In all suits and proceedings other than criminal arising under any of the revenue laws
of the United States, the attorney representing the government, whenever in his belief
any business book, invoice, or paper belonging to, or under the control of, the defen-
dant or claimant, will tend to prove any allegation made by the United States, may
make a written motion, particularly describing such book, invoice, or paper, and setting
forth the allegation which he expects to prove and if the defendant or claimant
shall fail or refuse to produce such book, invoice, or paper in obedience to such notice,
the allegations stated in the said motion shall be taken as confessed, unless his failure
or refusal to produce the same shall be explained to the satisfaction of the court ... ,
Id. at 187.
55 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 619-20.
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system, any segment of which could activate the exclusionary sanction through uncon-
stitutional conduct."
The notion that the commands of the fourth amendment apply equally to all actors
in the criminal justice system, whether officers of the executive or judicial branches,
continued in the 1914 case of Weeks v. United Stales." Weeks88 applied the exclusionary
rule to bar the admission in federal court of evidence which was obtained by federal
officers in violation of the fourth amendment." Underlying the majority's opinion was
the conclusion that the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amend-
ment, no less than its initial seizure, constituted an independent constitutional wrong."
Because during this time the fourth amendment's prohibitions were viewed as
restricting only the actions of federal officials, the Weeks decision resulted in a double
standard whereby only federal agents and not state officials had to contend with the
exclusionary sanction."' This produced an avenue through which illegally seized evidence
could continue to make its way into federal courts.92 In what came to be known as the
"silver platter doctrine," state agents would bring illegally seized evidence to their federal
counterparts who in turn would use it in federal prosecutions."
In 1960, however, the Supreme Court struck down the "silver platter" doctrine in
Elkins v. United States." In Elkins the Court held that, regardless of what sector of the
government was responsible for the transgression, unconstitutionally seized evidence
may not be used against an individual whose rights have been violated." Thus, the Elkins
Court carried the unitary model one step further. After Elkins the exclusionary rule not
9, Id. at 633-35. The Court determined that there was an intimate relationship between the
fourth and fifth amendments. The majority then equated the subpoena at issue with the compulsion
of testimony to disclose the contents of the papers. The Court then concluded that the admission
of the papers was a violation of the fifth amendment. Thus, under the Boyd decision, the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule was rooted in the compulsory self-incrimination provision of the fifth
amendment. Id.
97 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
" The majority noted that "RIM effect of the fourth amendment is to put the courts of the
United States and federal officials ... under limitations and restraints . . .." The majority continued,
"The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means
of unlawful seizures ... should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts ...." Id. at 391-
92.
" Id. at 398. In Weeks, unlike Boyd, the Court based its analysis strictly on the fourth amendment.
Thus Weeks was the first formulation of the modern exclusionary rule, See id. at 389.
910 Id. at 398.
9 ' See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 210 (1960). At the time, the fourth amendment
was seen as limiting federal, not state, action. Id.
92 Id .
93 See id. It was called the "silver platter" doctrine because state law enforcement officials were
said to bring illegally seized evidence to federal agents "on a silver platter." See Lustig v. United
States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1959).
94 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960). In Elkins, the petitioners, who had been indicted for intercepting
telephone conversations, moved to suppress as evidence several tape and wire recordings which
had been seized by state law enforcement officers in the home of one of the petitioners under
circumstances which, two Oregon courts had found, rendered the search and seizure unlawful. Id.
at 206-07. During the course of these state proceedings, federal officers, acting under a federal
search warrant, obtained the articles from the safe-deposit box of a local bank where the state
officials had placed them. Shortly after the state case was abandoned, a federal indictment was
returned, and the instant prosecution followed. Id. at 207 n.I .
95 Id.
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only restrained the coordinate branches of the federal government with equal force, but
also restrained state authorities."
A year later in 1961, the principle that any federal-state distinctions regarding the
use of unconstitutionally seized evidence are contrary to the policy of maintaining the
purity of the evidence gathering process embodied in the exclusionary rule became
manifest in Mapp v. Ohio.97 In Mapp, the Court held that evidence seized by state officials
in violation of the fourth amendment was inadmissible in state court." Again the focus
of the Court's decision was on the exclusion of tainted evidence from criminal prose-
cutions rather than on which branch of government or tier of the federal system com-
mitted the constitutional violation."'
In short, the early exclusionary rule cases portrayed the branches of government as
mere components of a single evidence gathering and prosecution network. For fourth
amendment purposes, no distinction was perceived between the procuring of evidence
by law enforcement officers and its admission by courts.") Central to this unitary per-
spective was the concept introduced in Weeks, that the admission of illegally seized
evidence is a separate violation of the fourth amendment. 101 Through this analysis the
scope of the exclusionary rule was continually expanded to ensure that the products of
illegal seizures could not find their way into state or federal courts.'"
B. Police Deterrence as the Justification for the Exclusionary Rule
More recent fourth amendment cases have witnessed the ascendency of the police
deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule, with an attendant narrowing of the scope
of the rule.'" Courts which espouse this theory begin with the premise, contrary to
96 Id. at 215.
97 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Mapp, Cleveland police officers forcibly entered Mrs. Mapp's home.
She demanded to see a search warrant. A paper, said to be a warrant, was held up by an officer.
She grabbed the alleged warrant and placed it in her bosom. A struggle ensued in which the officers
recovered the paper. An extensive search of the home was conducted. No warrant was produced
at trial. Id. at 644-65.
99 Id. at 660. In addition to preventing the use in state courts of illegally obtained evidence,
Mapp put to rest the last vestige of the "silver platter doctrine" that had survived Elkins. Although
Elkins disallowed use in federal courts of evidence illegally seized by state officials, until Mapp federal
agents could hand over their ill-gotten evidence to state officials, who were free to use it in state
courts. Id. at 658.
99 Id. at 654-55. The Court stated that it was "clos[ing] the only courtroom door remaining
open to evidence secured by official lawlessness ...." Id.
LOS See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
int Id.
I" See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 654-55.
103
 The first significant appearance of police deterrence as a rationale for limiting the scope of
the exclusionary remedy was the case of Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). In Linkletter, the
Court was presented with the question of whether the holding of Mapp should be retroactively
applied. The Court concluded that because the misconduct had already occurred, the deterrent
purpose of the rule would not be advanced by releasing prisoners convicted before Mapp. Id. at
636-77.
In the 1949 case of Wolf v. Colorado, the Court had implied that the purpose of exclusion was
to deter police. 338 U.S. 25, 31-33 (1949). The Wolf Court incorporated the fourth amendment
into the fourteenth, making it enforceable against the states, but held that the states need not adopt
the exclusionary remedy. Id. at 33. Insofar as Wolf stood for the latter proposition, it was overruled
by Mapp. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960), quoted with
approval in Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656, mentioned a deterrent purpose for the rule, but did so in the
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Weeks, that there is no separate fourth amendment violation in admitting illegally seized
evidence.m The decision to admit or exclude evidence thus becomes a discretionary one.
In coming to this decision judges are to look to the underlying purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule. According to the police deterrence rationale, the prevention of unreason-
able official intrusions, rather than maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice
system, stands as the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule.'° 5 Therefore, the exclusionary
sanction is justified only insofar as it has an impact on the future conduct of those
officials who are directly involved in such intrusions by performing searches, namely the
police. 1 °6 In short, the applicability of the exclusionary rule becomes a function of cost-
benefit analysis whereby the costw to society of excluding the evidence is set against any
benefit in the form of police compliance with the fourth amendment, which exclusion
of the evidence would bring. 1 °8
Since its first significant appearance in Linkletter v. Walker, ' 09 where the Court refused
to apply retroactively the holding of Mapp, the police deterrence rationale coupled with
the balancing of costs and benefits has often been used to curtail the application of the
exclusionary remedy. Though the Supreme Court never acceded to the use of illegally
seized evidence in the prosecution's case-in-chief, the Court has allowed its use in various
collateral contexts. The Court has held, for example, that illegally seized evidence may
be used in federal civil trials 1 to to impeach statements made by a defendant during
proper cross-examination,"' and may be used against persons who lack standing to raise
a fourth amendment claim." 2
Perhaps the paradigm case for the police deterrence rationale was the 1974 decision
of Calandra v. United States." 3 En Calandra, the Court used the deterrence theory and
applied cost-benefit analysis to hold that a witness before a grand jury may not refuse
to answer questions on the ground that they are based on the fruits of an illegal search." 4
course of expanding the exclusionary rule, unlike later cases, which used such rationale to restrict
it. In addition, while the Court spoke of deterrence, it did not specify at whom any deterrent effect
was aimed. No specific mention of police deterrence was made. Id.
I" See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974).
' 05 See, e.g., id. at 347-48.
' 06 See id. at 354.
'" The cost to society of excluding evidence was encapsulated by Cardozo's epigram "[t]he
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered." People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150
N.E. 585, 587 (1926). The cost of the rule has been put less succinctly: the rule diverts attention at
trial from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence which should be the main concern, the
evidence that is sought to be excluded is generally highly probative of guilt and guilty defendants
may be freed. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-90 (1976).
'" 6 See, e.g., Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348-52.
169 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
11 ° United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976).
"' United States v. Haven, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1979).
" 2 See Rakas v. United States, 439 U.S. 128, 133 (1978); Alderman v. United States, 395 U.S.
165, 172 (1969).
n2 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
14 Id. at 354. In Calandra, the respondent's place of business was being searched by federal
agents under a warrant issued in connection with a gambling investigation. Id. The warrant specified
that the object of the search was to seize bookmaking records and wagering paraphernalia. Id. One
agent discovered and seized a suspected loansharking record. Id. Subsequently, a grand jury inves-
tigating loansharking activities subpoenaed the respondent to query him on the seized evidence,
but he refused to testify on fifth amendment grounds. Id.
The district court granted respondent's suppression motion on the grounds that the affidavit
supporting the warrant was insufficient and that the search exceeded the scope of the warrant. Id.
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The majority began by stating that the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is the
deterrence of future unlawful police conduct." 5 The Court then made clear that the
application of the rule should be restricted to those instances where it is most effective. "6
The Calandra Court then compared the cost of excluding the illegal evidence, namely
the undue disruption of the investigative functions of the grand jury, with the deterrent
effect such exclusion would have on police, which the Court deemed "uncertain at
best." 17 The Court attributed this minimal deterrent value to the fact that any incentive
for police to disregard the commands of the fourth amendment merely to obtain a grand
jury indictment is offset by the inadmissibility of the illegally seized evidence at the
subsequent trial." In short, the Calandra majority determined that the balance of costs
against benefits dictated that the government prevail in this instance. 19 On the basis of
this balancing, the Calandra Court concluded that the use of illegally seized evidence
"works no new fourth amendment wrong. "120
The prelude to Leon and Sheppard was United States v. Williams,' 2 ' a case decided by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The issue in Williams was
whether evidence obtained through a search incident to a warrantless arrest for which
probable cause did not exist could nonetheless be admitted in the prosecution's case-in-
chief when the arresting officer acted in good faith. The circuit court relied heavily on
the assertion that the exclusionary rule exists only to deter police' 22 and engaged in the
balancing of social costs and deterrent benefits in resolving the case before ii. 123 The
Williams Court concluded that evidence is not to be suppressed where it is discovered by
officers in the course of actions that are taken in good faith and in reasonable belief that
they are authorized. 12 '
Thus the historical backdrop of Leon and Sheppard is a long line of adjudication in
which the Supreme Court initially employed the unitary outlook to expand the exclu-
sionary rule. A central tenet in this theory was that a court committed an independent
fourth amendment violation by admitting illegally seized evidence. Recent cases, however,
have restricted the rule through the use of the fragmentary perspective. According to
this view, the decision to admit illegally seized evidence becomes a discretionary one,
which should be made by considering the advancement of police deterrence that exclu-
sion in a particular instance will achieve. Up until 1984 when the Leon and Sheppard cases
were decided, the Court had employed this fragmentary view to attack the outer edges
of the exclusionary rule. The issue that remained open was whether the Supreme Court
would utilize the fragmentary perspective to attack the very heart of the exclusionary
The lower court further ordered that respondent need not answer any of the grand jury's questions
based on the suppressed evidence. The court of appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. Id.
119 Id. at 347.
• " 6 Id. at 348.
117
 Id. at 349.
n' Id. at 351.
119 Id. at 351-52.
1 " Id. at 354.
121
 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980).
' 22 See id. at 840-43.
' 23 1d. Once again, cost-benefit analysis came to the fore. "The costs to society of applying the
rule beyond the purposes it exists to serve are simply too high ... in this case the release of a
recidivist drug smuggler , with few or no offsetting benefits." Id. at 840.
' 21 Id. at 840-43.
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rule, namely allowing the use of illegally seized evidence in the prosecution's case-in-
chief. This issue, treated at the circuit court level in Williams, was finally confronted by
the Supreme Court in Leon and Sheppard.
II. THE LEON AND SHEPPARD DECISIONS: THE EMERGENCE OF A "GOOD-FAITH
EXCEPTION" TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. The Reasoning of the Supreme Court in United States v. Leon
The Leon majority began its opinion with the contention that the exclusionary rule
is a judicially created safeguard with the sole purpose of deterring police misconduct. 125
In accordance with this perspective the Court reasoned that the rule necessarily is not
designed to punish the errors of magistrates. 126 The majority noted that when the victim
of an unconstitutional search comes before a court his or her fourth amendment rights
have already been completely compromised.'" The majority stated that exclusion of
evidence cannot restore the defendant's trammeled rights and that, therefore, a court's
decision to admit the fruits of the search cannot be seen as an independent fourth
amendment violation.' 29 The decision whether to admit or exclude evidence accordingly
is removed from the realm of constitutional inquiry and becomes an issue of efficiency
susceptible to resolution through cost-benefit analysis.' 29 .
Having accepted the balancing approach for determining the propriety of exclusion
in a particular instance, the Court assessed the possible police deterrent benefit that the
suppression of evidence in situations where the police acted in good faith would pro-
duce.'" The starting point for the majority was the assertion that the exclusionary
sanction is only appropriate where the fourth amendment violation is substantial and
deliberate." According to the majority, these elements are by definition lacking when
an officer acts in good faith.'" The Court stated that this was particularly true when an
officer relies in good faith on a warrant.'" The Leon majority reasoned that the Court
cannot expect an officer to question a magistrate's probable cause determination.'"
'" Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3412. While the majority contends that the exclusionary rule is merely a
judge-made deterrent safeguard, Justice Brennan contends that it is a necessary implied corollary
to the fourth amendment. See id. at 3431-36 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The controversy over the
jurisprudential versus constitutional nature of the exclusionary rule is beyond the scope of this
casenote. For the purposes of this casenote, the majority's assertion that the rule is a judicially
created remedy will be accepted. For a full discussion of this issue, see Kamisar, supra note 6; Schrock
& Welsh, supra note 6; Stewart, supra note 6.
"6 Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3412.
' 27 Id. at 3418.
' 25 Id. at 3412.
125 Id.
13° Id. at 3413. The Court stated: that "Indiscriminate application of the exclusionary rule,
therefore, may well .generat(e] disrespect for the law and the administration of justice.' Accordingly,
Ta]s with any remedial devise, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served. — Id. (citations omitted).
"' Id. at 3419-21.
"2 Id. at 3413- 14.
' 3 ' Id. at 3419-20.
1 " Id. at 3420. The Court stated that once a warrant issues there is nothing more a police
officer can do to comply with the law. Id.
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The majority, however, stressed that the good-faith reliance on a warrant must be
objectively reasonable.'" Furthermore, according to the Court, this objective reason-
ableness standard was said to presuppose that police officers have a reasonable knowledge
of what the law prohibits.'" The Court took note of police training programs which
make officers aware of the boundaries of the fourth amendment and the need to operate
within those bounds.'" The Court asserted that good faith was said to be inconsistent
with ignoring the possibility of illegality when an officer's training has given him reason
to be aware of the possibility that the limits of the fourth amendment are being trans-
gressed."" The Court concluded that under circumstances of reasonable good-faith
reliance on a warrant, excluding evidence would produce "marginal or non-existent
benefits."'"
In addressing the "cost" side of the equation, the majority contended that applying
the exclusionary rule in every case without exception would unduly impede the truth-
finding objective of trials."' The majority set out as costs of exclusion the loss of probative
evidence"' and the prospect of guilty defendants going free or receiving favorable plea
bargains through the specter of potential exclusionary rule problems." 2 Also tipping the
balance toward the cost side was what the Court viewed as the disproportionate windfall
such guilty defendants receive from what are often minor fourth amendment transgres-
sions."' Striking a balance between these "substantial" costs and the "non-existent"
benefits exclusion would bring, the Court held that the exclusion of evidence is not
warranted where an officer reasonably relies on a search warrant issued by a detached
and neutral magistrate."
The Court, however, was at pains to point out that the issuance of a warrant is not
an automatic guarantee of the admissibility of evidence obtained in reliance on it- 145 The
Court emphasized that under the standard established in Leon reliance on a warrant
must be reasonable.'" The majority made it clear that the Leon holding would not
preclude inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the issuance of warrants."7 The
majority then set out four situations where the newly created good-faith exception would
not be available,'" The suppression of evidence would remain appropriate, the Court
stated, if the issuing judge was misled by information which the affiant knew, or should
have known was use.I49
 The good-faith exception was also, according to the majority,
' 55 Id.
'" Id. at 3420 n.20.
137 Id.
'" Id.
"9 Id.
Ho Id. at 3412-13. The majority cited a study to the effect that the cumulative loss due to
nonprosecution or nonconviction of individuals arrested on felony drug charges is between 2.8%
and 7.1%. Id. at 3414 n.6 (citing Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About
the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NI] Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 1983 A.B.F. RES.
J. 611 at. 680).
141 Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3412.
' 42 1d. at 3412-13.
'" Id. at 3413.
144 M
115 Id.
See id. at 3417.
147 Id.
148 See id.
Id. at 3421-22.
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inapplicable if the magistrate wholly abandons his or her judicial role.' 5° The same holds
true, the Court stated, where the warrant is based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia
of probable cause as to render official reliance on it unreasonable."' Finally, the Court
stated, a warrant may be so facially deficient, for example, in failing to particularize the
place to be searched or the things to be seized, that officers could not reasonably presume
it to be valid.'"
The majority stated that it was not persuaded by arguments that a good-faith
exception would preclude review of constitutional questions, thereby "freezing" the
development of the fourth amendment."' The Court asserted that despite the newly
created exception, the constitutionality of searches and seizures would continue to be
reviewed by courts. 154
 The majority then proceeded to address the argument that such
"freezing" was inevitable because the good-faith exception would cause the underlying
fourth amendment issues to fail to meet the live controversy requirement of Article
111.' 55
 The Court stated that the issue of good-faith need not be decided until after the
question of whether a fourth amendment violation has occurred is addressed. 156
 The
Court contended that in fact, it often may be difficult to determine whether the officers
acted reasonably without resolving the fourth amendment issue.' 57
Looking to the facts of Leon, the majority found that the officers had indeed
reasonably relied on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate."' The Court
,5° Id. at 3422. The Court cited Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979), as an
example of abandonment of the judicial role. In Lo-Ji Sales, a New York state police investigator,
after purchasing and viewing two films from an adult bookstore and concluding that they were
obscene, took the films to a magistrate who also viewed them. Based on the investigator's affidavit,
the magistrate issued a warrant authorizing a search of the store and seizure of other copies of the
two films. The magistrate also included a provision in the warrant which authorized seizure of "the
following items which the court independently „ . has determined to be possessed in violation" of
the law. No items were listed following this statement. Rather, the magistrate accompanied the
investigator and other officers and independently reviewed films and magazines, authorizing the
seizure of certain ones. The search, which took six hours, resulted in the seizure of 431 reels of
film and 397 magazines. Id. at 321-23. The United States Supreme Court ruled that the magistrate
in Loll had abandoned his neutral and detached role. The Court noted that he became a member
of the search party and helped to conduct a generalized search under a warrant that failed to
particularize the items to be seized. Id. at 326-28. See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971).
Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3422.
"2 1d.
I" Id. As this casenote will later discuss (see infra notes 316-25 and accompanying text), critics
of the majority's position in Leon have argued that a good-faith exception will obviate any future
review of fourth-amendment issues as cases will be resolved on the narrower good faith grounds.
The fear is that search and seizure will be removed from the realm of constitutional adjudication
and fourth-amendment rights will turn on the factual issue of whether the requirements of good-
faith reliance have been met. Such a situation is said to have the effect of stagnating the development
of the fourth amendment as a body of law. See Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3444-45 (Brennan, j., dissenting),
discussed infra notes 192-200 and accompanying text.
164 Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3422-23.
'55 Id.
"6 Id. at 3422.
1 " Id. at 3423.
I " Id. In Leon a tip from an informant of unproven reliability was followed by an extensive
investigation of the respondents. Id. at 3410. An application for a search warrant, which was
reviewed by several district attorneys, was submitted to a judge who issued a facially valid warrant.
Id. at 3411.
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further found that the facts in Leon presented none of the four situations which would
preclude use of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 159 Concluding that no
deterrence function would be served, the Court determined that the extreme sanction
of exclusion was inappropriate.'"
Justice Blackmun, in a short concurring opinion,'" asserted that the decision to
adopt a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should be a provisional one. 162 He
shared the majority's position that the Court must indulge in empirical judgments as to
the rule's effectiveness as a police deterrent in order to determine the rule's applicability
in a particular instance.' 63
 Yet Blackmun believed that such judgments are necessarily
provisional in nature.'" He stated that if the good-faith exception results in a material
change in police compliance with fourth-amendment standards, the Court would have
to reconsider the desirability of the rule.' 65
 In short, Blackmun posited that the scope
of the exclusionary rule is subject to change in light of evolving judicial understanding
about the effects of the rule outside the confines of the courtroom.' 66
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, submitted a lengthy dissent, asserting
that the Leon decision sounded the death'knell for the exclusionary rule. 167
 The dissent
objected to the majority's assumption that the underlying purpose of the rule is police
deterrence.' 68
 justice Brennan contended that any deterrence function ascribed to the
rule should operate not just against the police, but against the government as a whole.' 69
The dissent presupposed a single process in which the evidence-gathering role of the
police and the evidence-admitting function of the courts cannot be separated.' 7° By
admitting unlawfully seized evidence, Justice Brennan contended, the courts become
implicated in a single government action prohibited by the fourth amendment.'" In
short, the dissent concluded that the right to be free from the initial invasion of privacy
and the right to have illegally seized evidence excluded at trial are coordinate components
of the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 172
As Justice Brennan adhered to the "unitary" model of prosecution, he rejected the
majority's balancing approach whereby the vitality of the rule is linked to its effectiveness
as a police deterrent.'" He asserted that the majority's preoccupation with the "costs"
of excluding reliable evidence stems from a refusal to acknowledge that the very function
of the fourth amendment is to restrict the investigatory efforts of the government.'"
Justice Brennan contended that by restricting the manner in which searches can be
159
 Id.
16° Id.
161 Id. at 3423 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
162 Id. at 3424 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
,65
 Id.
161
 Id.
' 65 Id.
' 66
 Id.
167
 Id. at 3430 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
166 See id. at 3432-36 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
' 69 Id.
16 See id.
1" Id. at 3433 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
172 Id. at 3436-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'" Id. at 3436-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
174 Id.
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conducted, the amendment contemplates that some evidence will be lost. 15 Accordingly,
he concluded that it is the fourth amendment, not the exclusionary rule, which exacts
the costs bewailed by the majority. 176 Therefore, for Justice Brennan, exclusion of illegally
seized evidence was a mandatory measure, not a discretionary judgment contingent on
the outcome of a balancing test.
Justice Brennan then stated that, even if he were to accept the Court's balancing
approach, he would still disagree with the Leon result."' He claimed that the "costs"
attributed to the rule by the majority have been greatly exaggerated.m Indeed, Justice
Brennan stated, the costs of the rule, in terms of lost convictions and dropped prose-
cutions, are quite low.I''' Further, he contended that the majority erred in setting the
costs of exclusion in all cases against the deterrent benefit associated only with exclusion
in good-faith-reliance situations.'" The proper calculus, according to Justice Brennan,
would set only the costs of exclusion in good-faith-reliance cases against the bepefits of
exclusion in the same cases.' 81 In Brennan's view, the majority's approach of weighing
the costs from exclusions as a set, against the benefits which accrue from the subset of
exclusions in good-faith-reliance situations compels an inaccurate result. 182
in addition, Justice Brennan argued that fashioning an exception to the exclusionary
rule based on reasonable reliance on a warrant was superfluous in light of the Court's
recent decision in Cates.'" In Gates, the Court formulated a "totality of circumstances" .
test whereby the reviewing court merely looks to whether the magistrate had a substantial
basis for finding probable cause. 184 Justice Brennan contended that given such a relaxed
standard, it is inconceivable that a court could find a lack of probable cause under Gates,
but nonetheless find that a police officer's reliance on such a warrant was objectively
reasonable under Leon. 185 According to Justice Brennan, any other construction would
confront the Court with the paradox of objectively reasonable reliance on an objectively
unreasonable warrant.'"
Thus Brennan concluded that the Leon and Gates tests were in effect the same, and
intimated that the Court had an ulterior motive for creating the good-faith exception. 18 '
In Brennan's view, this motive was a desire to cut back on fourth-amendment protec-
tions.'" The ulterior motive and activist stance embodied in the majority's failure to
Id.
176 Id. at 3440 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
07 Id. at 3441-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
17'11 1d, Justice Brennan stated that:
[A) 1979 study prepared at the request of Congress by the General Accounting Office
reported that only 0.4% of all cases actually declined for prosecution by federal
prosecutors were declined primarily because of illegal search problems. Report of the
Comptroller General of the United States, Impact of the Exclusionary' Rule on Federal
Criminal Prosecutions 14 (1979).
Id. at 3441 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"9 Id. at 3442 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
LBO See Id.
1BI Id. at 3444 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
182 1d.
183 1d. at 3445 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra note 43 for a discussion of Gates.
1 " 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
'B1
	
104 S. Ct. at 3445-46 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
," Id. at 3445 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1 " Id. at 3445-46 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
188 Id. at 3430 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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remand Leon under Gates was the basis of the fear Justice Brennan expressed that the
Leon decision may be extended to situations in which there has been no reliance on a
warrant. 189
 The Justice saw the potential for an extension of the Leon exception to
situations where police officers, without warrants, conduct searches in good-faith on
their own determination of probable cause or exigent circumstances.'" in short, Justice
Brennan saw no limitation on the majority's capacity to "balance away" fourth-amend-
ment protections. 19 '
After having attacked the rationale of the Leon decision, Justice Brennan discussed
the unfortunate consequences which he felt were sure to follow in the wake of the
decision. 192 Justice Brennan believed that one consequence of the good-faith exception
would be that a magistrate's decision to issue warrants will be effectively insulated from
review.' 93
 Brennan noted that this would result because a police officer's reliance on a
warrant will have the effect of forgiving a magistrate's mistaken probable cause deter-
mination.'" Under the result in Leon, if a magistrate's decision to issue a warrant is
correct, evidence obtained pursuant to that warrant is, of course, admissible. L95 Justice
Brennan noted, however, that if the magistrate's decision is incorrect, but the police
relied on it in good-faith, the evidence will still be admitted. 196 Moreover, according to
Justice Brennan, the Leon ruling will inevitably result in a decrease in attention to detail
and investigative diligence on the part of the police.' 97 In effect, the police will be
encouraged to provide only the bare minimum of information on warrant applications.'"
Justice Brennan contended that the police will soon realize that if they obtain a warrant,
so long as its issuance was not entirely unreasonable, their conduct pursuant to the
warrant would be protected from further review)" Justice Brennan believed that these
ramifications of the Leon decision would have the consequence of weakening the probable
cause standard and undermining the integrity of the warrant process. 2"
Turning to the facts of Leon, Justice Brennan asserted that because probable cause
was admittedly absent, the warrant never should have been issued. 211 Justice Brennan
contended that once stripped of the authority of a warrant, the conduct of the police
officers in Leon was plainly an unconstitutional invasion of the respondents' homes. 2 "2
Therefore, the evidence must be suppressed, according to Justice Brennan, to restore
the government to the position it would have occupied had the unconstitutional search
not occurred.203
' >19 1d. at 3446 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 3944 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
' 9 ' Id. at 3444-45 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
' 9' Id. at 3944 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
," Id.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 3445 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
198 Id.
199 Id,
200 Id.
201 Id. at 3938 (Brennan, „IL, dissenting).
202 Id.
200 Id.
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In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens also discerned a paradox in the majority's
willingness to find objectively reasonable reliance on objectively unreasonable warrants. 2"
Justice Stevens similarly objected to the lack of judicial restraint which he felt was
exhibited by the Court in refusing to remand Leon to be reconsidered in light of Gates.205
Again like Justice Brennan, Justice Stevens believed that it was likely that probable cause
would have been found under the Gates rule and that the creation of a good-faith
exception could have been avoided. 206 Justice Stevens made clear that he disapproved
of the majority's attempt to settle the case on the broadest possible grounds in its
eagerness to carve out an exception to the exclusionary rule. 207
Justice Stevens also disagreed with the absolute deference given to a magistrate's
decision to issue a warrant and a police officer's subsequent reliance on that warrant. 208
He noted that up until the Leon decision, the fact that a magistrate issued a warrant had
not been a guarantee that the ensuing search would be found to be reasonable by a
reviewing court. 209 Justice Stevens stated that reviewing courts have always inquired into
the propriety of a magistrate's decision to issue a warrant."° Justice Stevens further
contended that the notion that a police officer's reliance on a warrant excuses its invalidity
is one that the framers of the fourth amendment would have vehemently rejected 2 "
because, according to Justice Stevens, the amendment was enacted with the primary
objective of preventing the improper issuance of warrants. 212 Thus, in his opinion, the
Court's decision in Leon was the product of "constitutional arnnesia.""s
Justice Stevens made clear that while he agreed with earlier cases where the Court
refused to apply the exclusionary rule to "collateral contexts in which its marginal efficacy
is questionable," the Leon decision was of a different order. 2 " In Leon, according to
Justice Stevens, the Court sanctioned the use of illegally seized evidence in the prose-
cution's case-in-chief. 216 He expressed amazement that for the first time, the Court held
that although the Constitution has been violated, no remedy need be provided. 21 " In
sum, Justice Stevens disapproved of the majority's conclusion that a search undertaken
without probable cause could nevertheless be deemed reasonable, 217
B. The Reasoning of the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. Sheppard
Having decided in Leon that the exclusionary rule should not be applied when
officers conducting a search acted in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant, the
204 Id.
205 Id. at 3447-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2°6 Id.
2" Id.
2" Id. at 3451-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2°9 Id. at 3451 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210 Id. at 3451-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
211
	
at 3452 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
212 Id. at 3452-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
213 Id. at 3453 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
214 Id. at 3456 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
215
216 Id. He noted that in all cases in which the good-faith exception would operate, there would
also be immunity from civil damages. Id. at 3456 n.35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
017 See id. at 3450 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Court went on to measure the search in Sheppard against this standard.'" The majority
stated that there was no question that the officers in Sheppard believed in good-faith that
the warrant was valid. 219 The only question to be addressed, the Court asserted, was
whether there was an objectively reasonable basis for this belief. 220 The majority, through
Justice White, concluded that there was. 22 '
The Court noted that the officers in Sheppard took every step possible to comply
with the law and refused to rule that an officer is required to disbelieve a judge who
assures the officer that he possesses a valid warrant. 222 Repeating the assumption that
the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police rather than punish judges' errors, and
finding that the deterrent function would not be served by exclusion, the Court declined
to apply the exclusionary rule to the facts of Sheppard. 222
Justice Stevens agreed with the majority that the evidence obtained pursuant to the
search warrant in Sheppard should be admitted. 224 He did not base his conclusion on the
good-faith exception, however, but on his belief that the fourth amendment was not
violated at all in Sheppard. 223 Justice Stevens believed that the police in that case got
proper authorization from a detached and neutral magistrate. 226
Turning to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's finding that the warrant
failed to meet the particularity requirement, Justice Stevens contended that the purpose
of the requirement is to prevent general searches. 227 He asserted that since there was no
danger of a general search on the Sheppard facts, the requirement should not be invoked
to suppress the seized evidence 2 28 The reason no such danger existed in this case, Justice
Stevens explained, was that the affidavit supporting the warrant application particularly
and accurately identified the things to be seized. 22s According to Justice Stevens, both
the police officers and the judge were fully aware of the contents of the affidavit. 230 In
short, Justice Stevens believed, there was no "occasion or opportunity for officers to
rummage at large." 2" Therefore, Justice Stevens concluded that even if there was a
technical violation of the particularity requirement, the search was still "eminently rea-
sonable."232
Justice Brennan, again joined by Justice Marshall, dissented from the Sheppard
decision. 233 Justice Brennan viewed the warrant's failure to describe with particularity
"a Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. at 3428. It will be remembered that in Sheppard, unlike Lean, probable
cause clearly existed. The warrant, however, was defective on its face because it authorized a search
for controlled substances. Though the issuing magistrate told the applying officer that he would
make the necessary changes, the defect was not cured. See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying
text.
2 ' 9 Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. at 3428.
225 Id. at 3428-29.
22 ' Id. at 3429.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 3429-30.
224 Id. at 3448-50 (Stevens, J., concurring).
225 Id. at 3449-50 (Stevens, J., concurring).
220 Id. at 3450 (Stevens, J., concurring).
227 Id,
220 Id. at 3448-49 (Stevens, J., concurring).
229 Id. at 3449 (Stevens, J., concurring).
259 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 3450 (Stevens, J., concurring).
299 Id. at 3439 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the things to be seized as determinative. 2" In his opinion, this violation of the particu-
larity requirement of the fourth amendment mandated the suppression of the evi-
dence."' According to Justice Brennan, there can be no such thing as a technical violation
of the Constitution which can go without redress. 25° Justice Brennan contended that the
fact that the officers only searched for the things mentioned in the affidavit was merely
fortuitous and should not be used to support the majority's argument."'
III. LEON AND SHEPPARD: SQUEEZING THE LIFE BLOOD OUT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
A. Exclusionary Rule Restrains Entire Government, Not Just the Police
Since its adoption by the Supreme Court in the 1914 case of Weeks v. United States,
the exclusionary rule has dictated that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment may not be used by the government in prosecuting individuals whose
constitutional rights have been violated. In the Leon and Sheppard decisions however, the
Supreme Court, through its use of the fragmentary view of the exclusionary rule, held
illegally seized evidence to be admissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief. This section
of the casenote analyzes the Court's decisions in these cases against the historical back-
ground of the exclusionary rule. First, this section will examine the Court's assumption
in Leon that the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police from conducting
illegal searches. This section will then criticize the Leon majority's use of cost-benefit
analysis in determining whether illegally seized evidence should be admissible. Next, this
section will contend that the Sheppard Court misapplied the principle enunciated in Leon
in further derogation of fourth amendment protections. Finally, this section will conclude
with a brief discussion of the deleterious effect which the Leon and Sheppard cases may
have on future fourth-amendment jurisprudence.
The majority's argument in Leon is grounded in the assumption that the exclusionary
rule exists only to deter lawless police behavior."' Yet, if the purpose of the rule is in
fact deterrence, it is deterrence of the whole government, not just the police, which is
contemplated. The proper view of the rule is that it restrains a monolithic prosecution
network. 2'9 This "unitary" concept of prosecution") is supported by both precedent and
logic. 241
That the exclusionary rule was not originally intended merely to deter police is
evident from the fact that in the Boyd case, where the rule made its first appearance, no
police conduct, let alone misconduct, was involved. 242 The Court's adherence to the
unitary model remained undisturbed in Weeks, 243 where the Court expressly recognized
2s'
	 at 3439-40 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
255 Id. at 3440 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
250 Id.
297
236 Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3412.
259 See id. at 3432 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
219 See supra notes 11-12 for a discussion of the fragmentary and unitary models of prosecution.
241
 See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392.
242
	 116 U.S. at 619-20. At issue in Boyd were subpoenas issued pursuant to an act of
Congress which gave the claimants the option of producing evidence or allowing allegations against
them to be taken as true. Id. See also Wasserstrom, supra note 6, at 394.
299 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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that the commands of the fourth amendment are directed to both the courts and the
executive. 244 The Weeks Court noted that the duty of giving effect to the fourth amend-
ment "is obligatory upon all entrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement
of laws." 245
The Court in Weeks focused on maintaining the integrity of the process of "bringing
proof to the aid of government." 246 In such a unitary prosecution structure "no distinc-
tion can be made between the Government as prosecutor and the Government as
judge."247 In the 1960 Elkins case, the Court went so far as to say that a conviction resting
on evidence obtained in an illegal search makes courts accomplices in disobedience of
the law. 248 This concept exposes the impropriety of Leon by illustrating that when a court
is presented with illegally seized evidence, application of the exclusionary remedy is not
discretionary, but mandatory if the court is to avoid committing an independent violation
of the fourth amendment. 249
Wholly apart from the language in the early cases which was consistent with the
unitary concept, the spirit of the cases in which the exclusionary rule was born would
seem not to countenance the Leon result. The Court in Weeks, Elkins and Mapp evinced
a desire to prevent admission of the fruits of an illegal search no matter which branch
of the government was the source of the violation. 250
 The emphasis was on turning away
tainted evidence at the courthouse steps. For example, in Mapp, the Court was gratified
to "close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official law-
lessness." 251 It would seem clear that cases such as Mapp and Elkins, in which the Court
labored to end vertical (state/federal) circumvention of the exclusionary rule, could not
tolerate horizontal (judicial/executive) circumvention by unequal enforcement. 252 The
Elkins majority noted that no distinction can logically be drawn between evidence ob-
tained in violation of the fourth amendment and that obtained in violation of the
244 Id. at 391-92.
245 Id. at 392. "The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain
convictions by means of unlawful seizures ... should find no sanction in the judgments of the
courts .. . ." Id.
246 Id. at 393.
241 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222-23 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)). See also Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3432 (Brennan, j., dissenting).
248 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 223 (citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943)). See also
Dodge v. United States, 272 U.S. 530, 532 (1926). "If the search and seizure [is] unlawful as
invading personal rights secured by the Constitution, those rights would be infringed yet further
if the evidence were allowed to be used." Id.
249
 This original understanding of the exclusionary rule stands in stark contrast to the Calandra
majority's assertion that the constitutional rights of a victim of an illegal search are completely
violated by the police intrusion and therefore a court's admission of the evidence "works no new
Fourth Amendment wrong." Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354.
25o
	
e.g., Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391-93.
25 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 654-55.
"2 See Brief for Repondents Sanchez, Stewart and Del Castillo at 24, United States v. Leon,
104 S. Ct. 3905 (1984).
It is a distinction without substance to attempt to insulate courts from the unlawful
activity of the police, since admission of the unconstitutionally-seized evidence makes
the court a participant in the illegality. Both the police who seized the evidence and
the court which allowed its use are part of the "government's approval of systemic
lawlessness."
Id. (citations omitted).
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fourteenth as "the Constitution is flouted in either case." 2Sg It would be no less illogical
to prohibit police from violating the fourth amendment but not to prohibit judges. Just
as it makes no difference to the victim whether his constitutional right has been invaded
by a federal agent or a state officia1,254 it would not matter to him whether his rights
were violated by a policeman or a judge. 2"
Justice Brennan put the matter in almost syllogistic form. 256
 He noted that seizures
are executed principally to secure evidence."' The utility of such evidence in a criminal
prosecution arises ultimately in the context of the courts. 255
 He therefore concluded that
the courts cannot be absolved of responsibility for the means by which evidence is
obtained. 259
 He was of the opinion that the evidence-gathering role of the police is
inextricably linked to the evidence-admitting role of judges and that "an individual's
fourth amendment rights may be undermined as completely by one as by the other." 26°
This unitary perspective underscores the folly of allowing a police officer's reliance
on a defective warrant to have the practical effect of excusing the magistrate's error in
issuing it. Clearly an error of constitutional dimensions by one sector of government
cannot be rendered innocuous by the fact that it was not detected by another sector.
The notion that reliance on a warrant lacking probable cause would excuse the defect
would have been anathema to the founding fathers, 26 '
Thus the majority's assumption that the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is
police deterrence is unfounded. The Court, however, started from this premise to
establish that the decision to apply the exclusionary remedy is a discretionary one. This
decision in turn, is to hinge on the weighing of the costs and benefits of exclusion in a
given instance. The Court's use of the weighing approach, however, raises several prob-
lems.
B. Flaws in the Majority's Use of Cost -Benefit Analysis
If the unitary perspective is indeed the proper view, the Court's attempt to link the
applicability of the exclusionary rule to its effectiveness as a police deterrent would seem
improper. Yet, even if one accepts the Court's methodology of balancing social costs
against police deterrence benefits, the Court's use of this analysis in Leon is still incorrect.
2" Elkins, 364 U.S. at 215.
254 Id.
255
	 Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3433 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated:
Certainly nothing in the language or history of the Fourth Amendment suggests that
a recognition of this evidentiary link between the police and the courts was meant to
be foreclosed. It is difficult to give any meaning at all to the limitations imposed by
the Amendment if they are read to proscribe only certain conduct by the police but
to allow other agents of the same government to take advantage of evidence secured
by the police in violation of its requirements. The Amendment therefore must be read
to condemn not only the initial unconstitutional invasion of privacy — which is done,
after all, for the purpose of securing evidence — but also the subsequent use of any
evidence so obtained.
Id. (citations omitted).
256
257
25e
259
264 Id. at 3435 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
28 ' See id. at 3452-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The Court's application of cost-benefit analysis was flawed because the data which the
Court used were inaccurate and because such data were misapplied. 262
The first problem that arises with the majority's use of cost-benefit analysis is the
accuracy of the data which the court used in its police-deterrence formula. The data are
hopelessly ambiguous 265 because while the costs of exclusion are highly visible, the
deterrent benefits are far more conjectural. 264 There appears to be a significant deterrent
effect on police conduct,265 even in good-faith situations, 266 but when that benefit is
present it defies documentation. 267 When the exclusionary rule does deter police it
produces a non-event, namely the non-conduct of an illegal search. 268 As it is "never
easy to prove a negative" it is hardly likely that conclusive data could ever be assembled. 266
On the cost side of the equation, the data that are available tend to support Justice
Brennan's assertion that the majority exaggerated the costs of the rule. 27° In fact, rarely
are cases dropped for prosecution or are defendants acquitted due to exclusionary rule
problems. 271 Justice Brennan cited a 1979 study to the effect that only 0.2% of all felony
arrests are declined for prosecution due to the potential of exclusion of evidence. 272
Brennan further contended that only 0.7% of cases that go to trial end in a dismissal or
acquittal after evidence is excluded. 2" He noted that these are figures for the cost of
exclusion in all cases and stated that the cost of exclusion in the narrower category of
cases where police make objectively reasonable mistakes is necessarily even smaller. 274 In
262 Id. at 3440-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
263 See Leon, 164 S. Ct. at 3437 (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Karathanos, 531 F.2d
26, 33 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976).
264 See Kamisar, supra note 6, at 621; LaFave, supra note 6, at 318-19.
265 See Brief for Repondents Sanchez, Stewart and Del Castillo at 52, United States v. Leon,
104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984):
Despite the unavailability of empirical data, experience with the exclusionary rule
demonstrates that it does have a deterrent effect on police conduct. The dramatic
increase in the use of search warrants in the post-Mapp years indicates that the Court's
decision impacted on police practices. Furthermore, the rule has caused police de-
partments to increase training of their officers to effectuate compliance with the
Court's Fourth Amendment decisions. Moreover, the rule has also encouraged working
relationships between police and prosecutors to ensure that evidence is obtained in
ways not resulting in its suppression.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3443 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
266 See Wasserstrom, supra note 6, at 396:
Justice White contends that suppression of evidence where an invalid warrant has
been obtained "cannot be expected to deter future reliance on such warrants." But of
course it can, if the police know that evidence may be suppressed despite the issuance
of a warrant, they will try harder to make sure that they have established probable
cause before they seek a warrant.
See also Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3444 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
267 See Kamisar, supra note 6, at 621; LaFave, supra note 6, at 318-19.
268 See Kamisar, supra note 6, at 621.
266 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 218.
27° Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3430, 3441 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
271 See id. at 3441-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
272 Id. at 3441-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Report of the Comptroller, supra note 178,
at 8, 10).
2" Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3441-42 n.11 (Brennan, J., disenting) (citing Report of the Comptroller,
supra note 178, at 8, 10).
274 Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3441-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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short, the empirical evidence which is available shows that the costs of the rule are not
as substantial as the majority contends, and the deterrent benefits are exceedingly dif-
ficult to determine. 275
Therefore, the majority's tactic of requiring that deterrent benefits outweigh costs
before the exclusionary remedy will be applied can be seen as a thinly veiled method of
reaching a predetermined result. 276
 As nothing can be proven conclusively either way,
the majority's assignment of the burden of proof as to deterrent effect becomes outcome
determinative."' Assuming, as seems reasonable, that the goal of the Burger Court is to
obtain more convictions, the ostensibly neutral cost-benefit test is exposed as a policy-
making tool.
Another and perhaps more basic problem with the Court's use of cost-benefit analysis
is that its invocation of Calandra and its progeny to justify the admission of evidence in
the prosecution's case-in-chief was improper because those cases assumed that illegally
seized evidence would not be so employed. 278
 The Leon Court grounded its balancing
approach on post-Mapp cases where the Court merely refused to extend the rule to areas
collateral to proof of guilt at a criminal tria1. 27" These prior cases dealt with issues such
as the admission of illegally seized evidence in civil trials 2 8" and the limitation of standing
to invoke the exclusionary rule. 281
 In these earlier decisions where the Court used the
balancing approach to avoid suppression in collateral contexts, the Court presupposed
that the exclusionary rule would apply with full force to the case-in-chief. 282
 The assur-
ance of a remedy which gives vitality to a right otherwise of no value was prerequisite
to the Court's accommodating social costs by manipulating the scope of the rule in areas
peripheral to the case-in-chief.
For example, in Calandra the Court decided that exclusion in the grand jury context
would not be warranted because "the incentive to disregard the requirement of the
fourth amendment solely to obtain an indictment from a Grand Jury is substantially
negated by the subsequent inadmissibility of the evidence in the criminal prosecution. "285
Thus these cases cannot be used to justify the Leon exception because they explicitly
contemplated the exclusion of illegally seized evidence in the case-in-chief. 284 Though
275 See id. at 3437 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus, the majority's tactic of imposing a burden of
proof as to the deterrent effect of the rule is outcome determinative.
276 See Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND.
Li. 329, 332-33 (1973). As Professor Canon has noted, the assignment of the burden to prove the
deterrence capability of the exclusionary rule "is little more than the adoption of an old 'debater's
trick' where when nothing can be proven either way, the first debater vigorously asserts that it is
incumbent upon the second debater to prove his arguments." Canon, Ideology and Reality in the
Debate Over the Exclusionary Rule: A Conservative Argument for its Retention, 23 S. TEX. L.J. 559, 564
(1982). See Brief for Respondents Sanchez, Stewart and Del Castillo at 51, United States v. Leon,
104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
277 See Brief for Respondents Sanchez, Stewart and I)el Castillo at 51, United States v. Leon,
104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
"' See id. at 20-21.
278 Id. at 20.
222
 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976).
221
 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 (1978).
222
 See Brief for Respondents Sanchez, Stewart and I)el Castillo at 20, United States v. Leon,
104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
282 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 351. See also Janis, 428 U.S. at 454.
284 See Brief for Respondents Sanchez, Stewart and Del Castillo at 21, United States v. Leon,
104 S. Ct. 3405.
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the Leon Court relies heavily on these cases, the "good-faith exception" represents a
quantum leap in fourth-amendment jurisprudence rather than merely a logical extension
of precedent. In short, the Court depended on cases which were premised on a foun-
dation that the Leon decision erodes, namely the assumption that the exclusionary rule
would be applied without exception to the case-in-chief.
C. Consequences of the Leon and Sheppard Decisions
Quite apart from their logical shortcomings, the Leon and Sheppard decisions will
have a variety of adverse consequences on fourth amendment jurisprudence. The likely
effects of the Leon and Sheppard rulings give insight to the Court's motivation in rendering
the decisions. The motivation which pervades the opinions is the majority's desire to
reduce the substantive protection afforded by the fourth amendment by denying a
remedy even if there has been a constitutional violation.
One untoward consequence of the good-faith exception is that it will serve to insulate
magistrates from effective review of their decisions to issue warrants. 285 The Leon Court
sent an unequivocal message that magistrates need not take much care when reviewing
warrant applications as their mistakes will have little or no consequence. 286 If the mag-
istrate's decision to issue a warrant is correct the evidence will of course be admitted.
Yet if the decision is incorrect but police relied in good-faith on the warrant, then the
evidence will still be admitted. 287 Attention to detail will necessarily dwindle as the focus
of review is shifted from the decision to issue a warrant to a police officer's reliance on
it.268 In short, apart from a professional desire to comply with the fourth amendment,
there is "no incentive for a magistrate to refrain from repeating the same mistake in the
future or from granting any colorable request for a search warrant." 289
This creation of a "super magistrate" beyond review is counter to the notion of
judicial deterrence being as essential to the safeguarding of the fourth amendment as
police deterrence.P') Although a magistrate's probable-cause determination should be
afforded considerable deference, the complete insulation from subsequent review cre-
ated by Leon is unwarranted. 291 As recently as Illinois v. Gates, 292 Justice Rehnquist wrote
285 Sec Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3494 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
286 Id.
287 Id. Sec United States v. Karathanos, 531 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1976), where the Second Circuit
refused to employ the good-faith exception. The Court noted that the exclusionary rule has the
effect of: •
making [magistrates] aware that their decision to issue a search warrant is a matter of
importance not only in regard to the constitutional rights of the person to be searched,
but also in regard to the success of any subsequent criminal prosecution, may well
induce them to give search warrant applications the scrutiny which a proper regard
for the Fourth Amendment requires.
Id. at 33.
288 Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3444 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
289 See Stewart, supra note 6, at 1403.
"° See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391-93. "[T]he Fourth Amendment was interpreted to secure the
citizen in person and property against unlawful invasion of the sanctity of his home by officers of
the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction." Id. at 394. See also Brief for Respondents
Sanchez, Stewart and Del Castillo at 29, United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
291 See Brief for Respondents Sanchez, Stewart and . Del Castillo at 30, United States v. Leon,
104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
292 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
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for the majority that the "courts must continue to conscientiously review the sufficiency
of affidavits on which warrants are issued." 295
 This directive seems to have been forgotten
by Justice Rehnquist and the rest of the Leon majority.
This lack of effective review is even more problematic than it would first appear,
due to the less than rigorous requirements for becoming a magistrate. In Shadwick v.
City of Tampa, 294 the Court ruled that civil servants with no legal training, appointed by
a city clerk, can become magistrates and issue warrants. 295 A recent study found that
approximately 14,000 non-attorneys are acting as judges in the United States.'" Some
states merely require a judge to be a high school graduate, while others require a judge
to be "literate." 297 Most of these, judges are authorized to issue both arrest and search
warrants.'" Thus, the Leon decision greatly increased the deference to and effect of a
magistrate's discretion. In a great number of instances, however, this discretion is not
exercised in an informed manner because many magistrates have no legal training.
Giving conclusive effect to the decisions of non-attorney magistrates to issue warrants
can only serve to weaken the protection against conviction by use of illegally seized
evidence.
The problems engendered by judicial deference to magistrates' discretion where no
such deference is warranted will be exacerbated by "magistrate shopping." 299 Since
admissibility of evidence will turn, not on the existence of probable cause, but on whether
the police found someone willing to sign a warrant, magistrate shopping will increase
dramatically. 595
 Since, under Leon obtaining the signature of a magistrate will be all but
conclusive as to the validity of the warrant, it will behoove police to go to a lenient
magistrate, 59 1 This is in contrast to the present system of universal application of the
exclusionary rule, where officers benefit from seeking warrants from demanding mag-
2" Id. at 239.
254 407 U.S. 345 (1972).
2" Id. at 352-54. The Court noted that "Mt has never been held that only a lawyer or judge
could grant a warrant regardless of the court system or type of warrant involved." Id. at 348. The
Court considered only the issuance of a warrant for violation of a city ordinance, noting that the
clerk was not authorized to issue search warrants. Id, at 347. But in practice judicial systems have
granted authority far beyond that in Shadwick. See Brief for Respondent Leon at 11, United States
v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). For example, in State v. Upchurch, 267 N.C. 417,148 S.E.2d 259
(1966), a search warrant was issued by an assistant clerk of the recorder's court of Durham County,
North Carolina. The state Supreme Court found the clerk did not have "the slightest comprehension
as to what her legal duties and responsibilities [were] in connection with the issuance of search
warrants." Id. at 419, 148 S.E.2d at 61.
290
 Brief for Respondent Leon at 10-12, United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984) (citing
L. SILBERMAN, NON ATTORNEY JUSTICE. IN THE UNITED STATES: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY, 25 (1979)).
291 Id. at 11-12 (citing L. SILBERMAN, NON ATTORNEY JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY, at 25).
259 Id.
299 See id. at 56; Brief for Respondents Sanchez, Stewart and Del Castillo at 25, United States
v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
550 Police already shop for the most lenient magistrates for presentation of their warrant
applications. Brief for Respondents Sanchez, Stewart and Del Castillo at 25 n.12, United States v.
Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); see also Brief for Respondent Leon at 22, United States v. Leon, 104
S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
001 See Brief for Respondent Leon at 56, United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); Brief
for Respondents Sanchez, Stewart and Del Castillo at 25, United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405
(1984).
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istrates. 302 In the post-Leon era the requirements for a warrant will become whatever it
takes to get a signature from the most lenient magistrate. 303 The premium which Leon
puts on reliance and the insulation of magistrates from review will serve to perpetuate
this state of affairs.
Perhaps the most compelling criticism of the Leon decision is its dangerous potential
to compromise the probable cause standard. 304 In Gates the Court ruled that "the task
of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical common sense decision whether,
given all of the circumstances ... there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence
of a crime will be found in a particular place." 3°° Moreover, reviewing courts only look
to whether the magistrate had a "substantial basis" for concluding that probable cause
existed."° Essentially the Leon Court is proposing that yet another layer of deference is
to be added to the lenient Gates standard. 307 Evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant
that could not meet the lenient requirements of Gates may still find its way into court
through the Leon exception. The Leon decision would thus result in a "double dilution" 308
of the fourth-amendment probable-cause standard."°
300 See Karathanos, 531 F.2d at 34.
If a magistrate's issuance of a warrant were to be, as the government would have it,
an all but conclusive determination of the validity of the search and of the admissibility
of the evidence seized thereby, police officers might have a substantial incentive to
submit their warrant applications to the least demanding magistrates, since once the
warrant was issued, it would be exceedingly difficult later to exclude any evidence
seized in the resulting search even if the warrant was issued without probable cause
. . . . For practical purposes, therefore, the standard of probable cause might be diluted
to that required by the least demanding official authorized to issue warrants, even if
this fell well below what the Fourth Amendment required.
Id.
3n3
	
existence of "rubber stamp" magistrates has long been acknowledged. In a recent study,
it was revealed that the magistrate who received the most warrant applications in one city had
rejected only one search warrant application in fifteen years as a judge. See Brief for Respondent
Leon at 18, United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). The number of "rubber stamp" magistrates
may not be large but they can have a significant impact. See Connelly v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245
(1977). There, the Court held that a justice of the peace who issued arrest and search warrants
under a statute providing payment of a fee to the justice of five dollars for each warrant issued
and nothing for each warrant refused was not a neutral and detached magistrate under the Fourth
Amendment. The justice had testified that during a period of several years he had issued about
10,000 warrants. Id. at 246-51.
3"4 See Brief for Respondents Sanchez, Stewart and Del Castillo at 35-42, United States v. Leon,
104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
000 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
3°e
See Brief for Respondents Sanchez, Stewart and Del Castillo at 37 n.23, United States v.
Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); Wasserstrom, supra note 6, at 397. Under Gates, the reviewing court
must uphold a warrant if, "in the totality of the circumstances," a "substantial basis" exists for the
magistrate's conclusion that there was a "fair probability" that the items to be seized would be found
in the places to be searched. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39. Another layer of deference, in the form of
a good faith exception for warrants found invalid even under these extraordinarily lax standards,
would surely be laying it on a bit thick. Brief for Respondents Sanchez, Stewart, and Del Castillo
at 37 n.23, United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984) (citations omitted).
3" Brief for Respondents.Sanchez, Stewart and Del Castillo at 36, United States v. Leon, 104
S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
309 Id.
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In the wake of Leon, warrants will not even require a "substantial basis" or a "fair
probability" that evidence can be found in the place to be searched."° Rather, the
determinative factor will become whether a police officer could reasonably have believed
that a judge had a "substantial basis" for finding probable cause.3 " In the end, Leon will
transform probable cause into whatever appears reasonable to a police officer. 312 This
situation will pervert the notion that a neutral and detached magistrate, rather than an
interested police officer, is supposed to make probable-cause determinations. 313
The prospect of a watering down of the probable-cause standard is perfectly con-
sistent with the Burger Court's objective of avoiding the loss of convictions on fourth-
amendment grounds. The Court could have achieved this goal either by weakening the
Gates probable-cause standard, or by narrowing the scope of the exclusionary ride. The
majority chose the less controversial route of eviscerating what it termed a discretionary
rule rather than conducting a direct attack on the explicit constitutional requirement of
probable cause. The end result, namely more convictions, is of course the same. This
helps to explain the majority's refusal to remand Leon under Gates, as the Court opted
to weaken substantive fourth amendment protections by narrowing the exclusionary rule
with the secondary but inevitable result of diluting the probable cause requirement. In
short, the Leon majority circumvented the text of the fourth amendment and under-
minded the probable-cause component of' the fourth amendment right by the simple
expedient of denying a remedy. The distinction between directly attacking a textual
right and denying a remedy is specious, however, because a right without a remedy for
its violation is form lacking substance.
Of course, the question of whether a fourth-amendment violation has in fact oc-
curred may well become moot as Leon goes a long way toward removing the law of
search and seizure from constitutional discourse. Despite the majority's claim that the
good-faith exception will not preclude review of the constitutionality of scarches, 3" the
more realistic view is that Leon will stop the development of the amendment "dead in its
tracks."315 It is unlikely that when a case can be settled on the narrower ground of the
good-faith exception that courts would go on to render merely advisory opinions over
whether the fourth amendment had been violated.''" Though the Court insists that
defendants who seek to exclude evidence present.live controversies and that the fourth
amendment question could be addressed first, 317 practicality and precedent counsel
otherwise. It seems clear that the cases and controversies requirement of Article III,
section 2 would prohibit a court from deciding the constitutional question if it had
deemed evidence admissible under the Leon rule. 3 " For example, in Bowen v. United
'I" See Brief for Respondent Leon at 54•56, United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
511 Id. at 55.
312 Id.
• 5I5 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,13-14 (1948). The point of the fourth amendment,
which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement of the support
of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in
requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Id,
3 " Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3422-23.	 •
515 United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531,554 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
516 Brief for Respondent Leon at 26, United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3422-23.
5 " Brief for Respondent Leon at 26, United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
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States, 319
 the Supreme Court cautioned federal district and appellate courts against de-
ciding fourth amendment issues when the retroactivity question resolved the case. 320
 In
any case, such a procedure would flout the jurisprudential practice of avoiding unnec-
essary constitutional decisions. 321
From a practical standpoint, federal courts with overloaded dockets cannot be
expected to resolve complex fourth-amendment issues when the evidence is admissible
in any event. 1 '22
 That this will be the case is shown by the prelude to Leon, United States
a. Williams. 323 In Williams, thirteen judges considered it unnecessary to determine if the
arrest was illegal since "evidence is not to be suppressed under the exclusionary rule
where it is discovered by officers in the course of actions taken in good-faith." 32' Again,
one must look no further than the Sheppard decision to see that the potential for
stagnation of the fourth amendment will be realized. In Sheppard, the Court refused to
decide the merits of the fourth-amendment question, dismissing it as a "fact-bound issue
of little importance." 325 The Sheppard decision is an example of the perfectly logical step
of deferring the fourth amendment issue until after it is determined whether evidence
will be admitted under the good-faith exception. It is obvious that in all such cases the
fourth-amendment question will similarly be "fact-hound" and "of little importance."
Despite the Supreme Court's assurances, it seems improbable that courts with crowded
dockets will find the time to field hypothetical constitutional questions.
In summary, the following adverse consequences from the Leon decision arc fore-
seeable. In making reliance on a warrant the crucial determinant of the admissibility of
evidence, great deference is accorded to the discretion of often underqualified magis-
trates. By ruling that such deference is controlling even if the magistrate's probable-
cause determination does not meet the Gates test, a weakening of the probable-cause
standard is inevitable. The result will be an undermining of fourth-amendment rights
through the subterfuge of denying a remedy in the event of an acknowledged violation.
In the process, the Court, made the correction of these deficiencies unlikely by effectively
removing the issue of whether the fourth amendment had been violated from future
search and seizure jurisprudence. The factual inquiry as to whether or not good-faith
existed will substitute for constitutional interpretation. These ramifications are readily
foreseeable, and the Court no doubt was cognizant. of them when it reached the Leon
result. Their existence indicates that the Court had a predetermined objective in mind,
namely, the emasculation of the substantive protections of the fourth amendment.
Sheppard, at least at first blush, scents less objectionable than Leon. In Sheppard, unlike
Leon, probable cause clearly existed. The Sheppard decision, however, is objectionable for
two reasons. First, the reasoning of the Court suffers from the same deficiencies that
31"422 U.S. 916 (1975).
32"Id. at 920. The Court noted its reluctance to decide constitutional questions unnecessarily.
Id. See also DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974) (federal courts are without power to
decide questions that cannot affect the rights of the litigants before them). Id.
32 See Peltier, 422 U.S, at 555 n. 14 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Peltier, Justice Brennan stated
that -Where is a clear precedent for avoiding decision of a constitutional issue raised by police
behavior when in any case the evidence [is' admissible in the particular case at bar." Id.
122 Brief for Respondent Leon at 27, United States v. Leon, 104 S. Gt. 3405 (1984).
323 622 F,2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980). cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
924 Id. at 840.
925 Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. at 3428 n.5.
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were present in Leon. Second, the Sheppard result makes clear that the Court was less
than forthright when it indicated that the good-faith exception would be narrowly
circumscribed.
As to the first objection, it is clear that Sheppard was wrongly decided if fidelity to
the unitary model of prosecution is to be maintained. Under this model, it is apparent.
that judicial errors relating to the particularity requirement, no less than those relating
to probable cause, cannot be rendered innocuous through police reliance. Seen in this
light, the fortuity that the police stayed within the bounds of the affidavit can have no
legal significance.:' 26
Like the Leon opinion, the Sheppard decision points up the thinly veiled ulterior
motives held by the majority and the disastrous consequences which this decision may
have on fourth-amendment jurisprudence. A brief review of the four situations in which
the good faith exception was not to apply will serve to expose these problems. The
majority claimed that the good-faith exception could not be invoked where the magistrate
was misled by information on an affidavit that the affiant knew, or should have known,
was false. 327 Nor would the Leon rule apply in cases where the issuing magistrate wholly
abandoned his judicial role. 326 The Court also stated that good-faith would be absent
when officers relied on a warrant based on an affidavit "so lacking in probable cause as
to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." 329 Finally, the good-faith
exception was not to apply when a warrant is "so facially deficient — i.e., in failing to
particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized — that the executing
officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.""°
This last exception exactly describes the situation in Sheppard. Though the affidavit
was detailed,"' the warrant did not mention the items to be sought or those that were
eventually seized. 332 On its face the warrant was one for controlled substances. 23 If the
"facial deficiency" exception to the Leon rule did not prevent the operation of the good-
faith exception to the exclusionary rule in Sheppard, it is doubtful that it. will ever he
activated.
The Court's failure to follow the alleged limiting principles of Leon in a case handed
down the same day is open to two interpretations, neither of which bodes well for the
future of the fourth amendment. The optimist may view the failure of the Court to
recognize that the facts of Sheppard fall squarely within the fourth exception as an
oversight. This would simply indicate that "reasonable good-faith reliance on a warrant"
is a concept incapable of exact interpretation and consistent application. A more cynical
but more credible view is that Sheppard demonstrates that the good-faith exception is a
pretext to effectuate the Burger Court's objective of squeezing the life out of the fourth
amendment. Under this view, once the way to discretionary enforcement is opened, it
quickly becomes a slippery slope with limitless potential for abuse.
326 See Lean, 104 S. Ct. at 3440 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
327 Id. at 3421.
3" Id. at 3422.
"9 Id,
53 " See id. at 3422.
331 See Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. at 3427.
"' See id.
393 Id.
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CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of United States v. Leon, evidence obtained in a police search need
not be barred from use in the prosecution's case-in-chief where an officer reasonably
relies on a warrant which is later found to be invalid. The Court's ruling makes possible
the use of evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant that fails to provide an accurate
description of the items to be seized. Together, Leon and Sheppard virtually destroy the
utility of the fourth-amendment exclusionary rule.
This casenote has determined that Leon and Sheppard were both wrongly decided.
The Leon majority's fundamental assumption that the purpose of the exclusionary rule
is merely to deter police is contrary to both logic and precedent. In the realm of criminal
justice, the branches of government are not atomic entities insulated from each others'
actions. Rather they are component parts of the same evidence-gathering network. A
transgression by one sector implicates the whole prosecution system. Certainly, a mistake
by a judge cannot be cured by the failure of the police to detect the error. The proper
unitary perspective recognizes that the effect on the citizen is the same regardless of the
origin of the constitutional error,
Sheppard, like Leon, treats judges and police as "constitutional strangers" 5" to each
other. But lack of particularity in a warrant, no less than lack of probable cause, is not
eliminated by a police officer's reliance. Even so-called "technical" constitutional viola-
tions cannot be tolerated if government-wide compliance with the fourth amendment is
to be achieved. Whether or not exclusion in Sheppard would have a deterrent effect on
police misses the point. Such exclusion would restrain judges who are equally able to
flout fourth-amendment rights.
Probably the most glaring defect in the Sheppard decision is that it fits neatly into
one of the situations to which the Burger Court claimed the good-faith exception would
not apply. Few warrants could present a clearer example of facial deficiency'than that
at issue in Sheppard. The Sheppard result raises grave doubt as to whether the Leon
exception will be subject to any limitations.
Marc W. McDonald
434 See Leon, 104 S. C:t. at 3435 (Brennan", J., dissenting).
